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THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY:
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR HOME RULE UNITS
IN ILLINOIS-URBANA V. HOUSER
"It requires no strong prisms to see the breadth and depth of home
rule powers," the Illinois Supreme Court stated in the recent decision Urbana v. Houser.1 However, for Illinois practitioners of local
government law, Houser represents the latest in a series of decisions
that have shrouded the nature of the powers of home rule units in
mystery.
The confusion is apparent in three areas: the definition of home
rule powers; the effect of statutes conflicting with exercise of home
rule powers; and the validity of statutes discriminating between units
of local government on the basis of the home rule powers they possess. 2 The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides the authority for home
1. 67 I11.2d 268, 367 N.E.2d 692 (1977).
2. The City of Des Plaines can testify to the inscrutability of home rule under Illinois
decisions. In contests with the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago (MSD), and
the Chicago and North Western Railway Co. (C&NW), it found that decisions suggesting that
home rule powers were broad and deep could be of surprisingly little importance in the face of
particular statutes.
Des Plaines' first encounter with the vagaries of home rule came in its effort to bar construction in a residential area of the city of a sewage treatment plant proposed by the MSD. In the
contest between the statutorily created MSD and the city on the basis of zoning powers, Des
Plaines had been dealt a stinging defeat before the 1970 Illinois Constitution became effective.
City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill.2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971). After
becoming a home rule unit, however, the city intended to recontest the issue. To its dismay,
the court held that the doctrine of res judicata was applicable and barred further litigation
notwithstanding the city's accession of home rule powers. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist., 59 Ill.2d 29, 319 N.E.2d 9 (1974). An imaginative effort enabled Des Plaines to
get another day in court when it shifted its basis of action from zoning to health control. However, the outcome was again a defeat, this time on the grounds that regional sewage treatment
plants, although located within a city, are not local concerns for the purpose of application of
home rule powers. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill.2d 256, 347
N.E.2d 716 (1976).
The ruling of res judicata, notwithstanding Des Plaines' change in status, seems to suggest
that home rule powers mean nothing in a power struggle with an instrumentality of the legislature such as the Metropolitan Sanitary District. Yet home rule units clearly are free to enact
ordinances that supersede inconsistent pre-1970 statutes. See Clarke v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 57 Ill.2d 50, 54, 309 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1974).
The second decision is similar to the result that Des Plaines encountered in its attempt to
impose noise standards on idling switch engines. The court determined that the Illinois Environmental Protection Act precluded local regulations that were more strict than those imposed
by the state, despite language in both the 1970 Constitution and the Act itself characterizing
state action as being in cooperation with local action. City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North
Western Ry. Co., 65 1ll.2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976). Viewed in conjunction with decisions
permitting municipalities to set higher minimum drinking ages than provided by statute, see,
e.g., Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City of Joliet, 26 I11.App.3d 27, 324 N.E.2d 453 (3d
Dist. 1975), this result is not easy to appreciate.
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rule powers in this state. Under Article VII, Section 6,3 qualifying
units of local government are authorized to exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to their government and affairs except as limited by the section itself or by legislation enacted in accordance with that section. 4 Powers under this grant are termed home
rule powers and, with respect to such powers, units of local government are liberated from their former status as complete creatures of
the legislature. Consequently, units so endowed are no longer subject
to Dillon's Rule, which held that units of local government are without power to act absent express or implied legislative authorization. 5
Home rule units enjoy autonomy with respect to local affairs unless
the legislature has preempted their powers in accordance with con6
stitutional prescriptions.
The scope of this autonomy, however, is defined by the phrase in
Section 6(a), "pertaining to its government and affairs." A few examples of these matters are provided in that section, 7 but, as recognized
at the Constitutional Convention, the general language of the constitutional grant of home rule powers requires significant judicial interpretation." The drafters contemplated that the grant would emFor a commentary on Des Plaines' experience, see Minetz, Recent Illinois Supreme Court
Decisions Concerning the Authority of Home Rule Units to Control Local Environmental Problems, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 306 (1977).

3. Section 6(a) provides that: "A County which has a chief executive office elected by the
electors of the county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are
home rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units."
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
4. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City of Joliet, 26 I11.
App.3d 27, 31, 32 N.E.2d 453,
455 (1975).
5. The rule "is so labeled because it found expression in I DILLION MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911)." Id.
6. Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1972). See 7
RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1616-17 (Local Government Report) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7. Article VII, Section 6(a) describes the grant of home rule powers as "including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
8. The Illinois Supreme Court has observed:
It was acknowledged in the constitutional debates that by virtue of the general
language of the grant and the qualifying phrase 'pertaining to its government and
affairs' the right of a home rule unit to exercise any power will ultimately depend
upon an interpretation by this court as to whether or not the power exercised is
within the grant of Section 6(a).
Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.2d 537, 540, 338 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1975), citing 4 PROCEEDINGS 3052. See also Baum, Illinois Home Rule-Part 1, 1972 ILL. L.F. 137, 152; Parkhurst,
Article VII-Local Government, 52 CHI. BAR REC. 94 (1970); Vitullo, Recent Developments in
Local Government Law in Illinois, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 85, 96 (1972). For a contention that
judicial interpretation would have been crucial regardless of the language chosen, see Sandalow,
The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV.
643, 664-67 (1964).
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brace local but not federal or state matters. 9 Because local concerns
often overlap with federal and state concerns, 10 determination of
whether a matter was federal or state in character could depend on
such factors as whether the matter was the subject of extensive state
or federal legislation or was assigned to a regulatory commission. 1 1
As a result, determination of whether a given power is a home rule
power frequently requires reference to statutes bearing on the same
subject matter. However, use of statutes for this purpose requires
12
careful reconciliation with subsection (i) of the home rule section.
This section provides that home rule units may exercise power concurrently with the state unless specifically preempted by legislation
3
complying with the standards set in subsections (g) and (h).1
Section 6 therefore calls for examination of statutes for two distinct
purposes: under 6(a) statutes may be considered as evidence as to
whether a given matter is by nature local; and under 6(g) and (h)
statutes may pre-empt home rule action by removing a matter from
the scope of home rule powers. For the first of these purposes, inferences can be freely drawn from any statute. For the second purpose,
however, only statutes specifically declaring an intent to pre-empt
14
and having been approved by constitutionally mandated majorities
9. Froehlich, Home Rule, in ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LAW, ch. 24, §§ 24.12 and 24.81
(IICLE, 1974) (noting framer's intent regarding limitation of home rule powers to local concerns).
10. Examples of overlap between local and larger unit concerns are abundant. Highland
Park, for example, found that widening of county highways passing through its city limits could
not be barred by city ordinance because such matters were beyond the scope of home rule
powers. City of Highland Park v. County of Cook, 37 III. App.3d 15, 344 N.E.2d 665 (2d Dist.
1975).
11. 7 PROCEEDINGS 1615-44.

12. Article VII, section 6(i) of the Illinois Constitution provides:
Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power
or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does
not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
13. The modes for such legislative preemption are set out in sections 6(g) and (h). Section
6(g) provides:
The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members
elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other power or
function 6f a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other than a
power or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g).
Section 6(h) provides:

The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by
the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing power or
a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(h).
14. Id.
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can affect home rule powers. The effect of these statutes is unambiguous: they bar any action by home rule units in that area.
Because statutes serve two purposes and are subject to different
standards for each purpose, home rule analysis requires that the purpose for which the statute is being examined be clearly deliniated.
Illinois decisions, however, have often failed to preserve this distinction. 1 5 As a result, it is difficult to predict which powers will be
found by the courts to be home rule powers or how statutes touching
upon activities of local government units will affect freedom of action
of home rule units. Whether a given power is a home rule power and
what effect a statute relating to such power should be given has become intertwined and confused.
In view of this confusion, statutes that discriminate between home
rule and non-home rule units pose a difficult problem for equal protection analysis. A statute does not deny equal protection if it operates differently upon classes which can be meaningfully distinguished, 16 but the difference between home rule and non-home rule
units consists simply of the former's possessing home rule powers.
Because the nature of these powers is confused, it is difficult to say
whether possession of or lack of such powers is a meaningful basis for
distinguishing between units of local government.
Against this background, Illinois practitioners have anxiously
awaited each reported decision relating to home rule powers and
statutes affecting such powers, hoping to expand their understanding
of the penumbra defining their scope. The recent decision in Urbana
15. Frustration with the lack of a clear approach for determination of whether a given power
is a home rule power is widespread. See Beibel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An
Uncertain Beginning, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 253 (1973); Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule in
the Courts, 63 ILL. B.J. 320 (1975); Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule in the Courts -Continued,
65 ILL. B.J. 214 (1976).
16. The formula most often employed is that equal protection is denied if a law provides
differing treatment to persons or things that are similarly situated with respect to the legislative
purpose. See Stein v. Howlett, 52 11.2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972) (distinction between state
and local government officials in Government Ethics Act upheld); Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co.,
51 Ill.2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443 (1972) (different notice requirements for suits by adults and
minors under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act upheld); King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.2d 247, 265
N.E.2d 874 (1970) (different notice requirements for suits under Government Employer and
Employee Tort Immunities Act for local and state governments upheld); Begich v. Industrial
Commission, 42 1ll.2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969) (limiting recovery under workmen's compensation laws for a nontraumatic injury).
Ironically, equal protection issues regarding discrimination between home rule and non-home
rule units are actually one-sided. By virtue of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, home rule units
are guaranteed a privileged status. "Equal protection" issues arise only where an attempt to
make non-home rule units in some way superior to home rule units is involved. Thus, the
constitution discriminates between home rule and non-home rule units, but discrimination by
the legislature is subject to scrutiny under constitutional equal protection principles.
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v. Houser, in which all three troublesome home rule questions (existence of a particular home rule power, effect of restrictive statutory
language and equal protection) were present would therefore have
intrinsic importance for local government lawyers. However, its
holding, that home rule units may utilize the Illinois demolition statute17 despite language in that statute appearing to deny such use, is
probably less significant than its analytical aspects. Houser is difficult
to reconcile with an earlier landmark home rule decision, and may
represent either an implied overruling of that precedent or a case of
first impression based on a subtle distinction.
The purpose of this Note is to review the analysis in Houser in
light of earlier decisions and their methods, to examine the resolution
of particular issues in Houser as well as its overall holding, and finally
to assess the future significance of Houser for cases involving home
rule units.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Urbana v. Houser arose from a complaint for demolition filed in
1976 by the City of Urbana, alleging that a structure within its
municipal limits was so dangerous and unsafe that its condition could
not be eliminated by repair and that the city's building official had
declared the structure dangerous within the meaning of the Illinois
demolition statute. Houser moved for dismissal, alleging that the city
lacked the power to maintain the action because the demolition statute upon which it relied had been amended in 1971 to exclude its
application to home rule units. 8
The circuit court dismissed the complaint, determining that the
demolition statute was unavailable to home rule units, so that a home
rule unit could maintain a demolition action only on the basis of its
constitutionally derived home rule powers. To do so, it reasoned, a
home rule unit would first have to enact an ordinance. 19 Urbana's
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-1 (1975).

18. The demolition statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-1 (1975), provides in part that
municipalities may "demolish, repair or cause the demolition or repair of dangerous and unsafe
buildings or uncompleted and abandoned buildings" after obtaining an order from a circuit
court. Id. Courts are to expedite applications for such orders. In addition, action pursuant to
such an order creates a lien against the property in question for the cost of such action. This
lien is "superior to all prior existing liens and encumbrances, except taxes." Id.
The 1971 amendatory act extended this statute to certain counties and concluded with the
words, "This Amendatory Act of 1971 does not apply within the jurisdiction of any home rule
Unit." P.A. 77-1416, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.
19. Urbana v. Houser, Memorandum of Decision No. 76-L-267 (6th Judicial Cir. 1976). The
requirement that the exercise of a home rule power be preceded by enactment of an ordinance
appears to be based on an interpretation of due process in actions by municipalities recited in
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claim that the statute denied equal protection to home rule units was
rejected. 20 The decision was appealed to the appellate court, and
then transferred to the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Rule
2
302(b).
ISSUES RAISED IN HOUSER

As the case unfolded before the circuit court, three issues were
presented. First, the court had to determine the meaning of the
statutory language cited by Houser as the basis for the claim that the
demolition statute had been made unavailable to home rule units.
Then, it was necessary to determine whether Urbana could exercise
demolition powers independently of statutory authorization. Finally,
it was necessary to consider whether there was any violation of equal
protection in applying the statute under the given circumstances.
The supreme court, however, did not explicitly isolate these three
issues. It characterized the issue as whether a home rule unit lacks
"the demolition authority conferred on it by statute prior to the 1970
Constitution because that statute was amended with a s~ntence stating that '[t]his amendatory Act of 1971 does not apply within the
22
jurisdiction of any home rule unit."'
This formulation of the issue may be significant for two reasons.
First, it presages an analysis that touches on the three issues isolated
by the circuit court but fails to resolve each before proceeding to the
next. Second, it indicates that the court viewed Houser in a unitary
People ex rel. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 38 I11.App. 3d 1016, 349
N.E.2d 807 (1972).
20. The right of home rule units to litigate in order to determine their rights was recognized
in Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 111.App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763
(1974).
21. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b) provides:
After the filing of the notice of appeal to the Appellate Court in a case in which the
public interest requires prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court or a justice thereof may order that the appeal to be taken directly to it [sic].
Upon the entry of such an order, any documents already filed in the Appellate
Court shall be transmitted by the clerk of that court to the clerk of the Supreme
Court. From that point the case shall proceed in all respects as though the appeal
had been taken directly to the Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110a, § 302(b) (1975).
One might wonder why Urbana did not moot the issue by enacting an ordinance meeting the
requirements of the circuit court decision. Some insight into the nonlegal factors operative in
the city government at that time which tend to explain Urbana's failure to do so is provided in
People ex rel. Urbana v. Paley, 68 Ill.2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977). In that case the city had
brought a mandamus action against its mayor in an effort to force him to sign certain general
obligation bonds and interest coupons authorized by an ordinance of the city council for the
purpose of acquiring a parcel of land as part of an urban development program. Id.
22. 67 1ll.2d 268, 271, 367 N.E.2d 692, 693 (1977).
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way, suggesting perhaps that the three distinct issues found by the
circuit court were not as crucial to the case as some single, unarticulated principle that the supreme court recognized.
Demolition as a Home Rule Power
The supreme court's discussion of whether demolition is a home
rule power is limited to a review of the basic principles of home rule
with an emphasis on the breadth and potency of such powers. However, no conclusion is articulated as to whether demolition is a home
rule power.
The court quoted the basic home rule grant in Section 6(a) of the
local government article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the provision for concurrent exercise of state and local powers in Section 6(i),
and the signal language of Section 6(m) that home rule powers are to
be construed liberally.2 3 The court also noted that home rule units
have an "autonomy and independence limited only to restrictions imposed by the Constitution or authorized by it," 24 and "have the same
powers as the sovereign except where such powers are limited by the
General Assembly." (The decision cited Kanellos v. Cook County 25 as
authority for the latter proposition, although that decision did not
make so strong a statement.) "According to the court, [i]t requires no
26
strong prisms to see the breadth and depth of home rule powers."
This treatment stands in stark contrast to home rule power analysis
under prior decisions which have employed five methods for determining whether a given power is a home rule power. First, the
examples listed in Section 6(a) sometimes have expressly covered the
power in question. 27 Second, it has been possible to analogize the

23. Section 6(m) provides that "[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). Apparently this subsection has been noted in only one
prior reported decision, Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.2d 537, 542, 338 N.E.2d 15, 18
(1975).
24. 67 Ill.2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977).
25. 53 Il.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1977). The actual language employed is:
Under the home rule provisions of the 1970 Constitution, however, the power of

the General Assembly to limit the actions of home rule units has been circumscribed and home rule units have been constitutionally delegated greater autonomy in the determination of their government and affairs.
Id. at 166, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
26. 67 1ll.2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill.2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975) (power to impose sales
tax on nonresidents selling within the jurisdiction); Evanston v. Cook County, 53 Ill.2d 312, 291
N.E.823 (1972) (power to tax property and non-property); Kanellos v. Cook County, 53 Ill.2d
161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972) (power to incur debt); Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill.2d 56, 284
N.E.2d 257 (1972) (power to impose privilege tax).
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power in question to one of those listed in Section 6(a). 28 Third, an
assessment of a given matter in relation to the phrase "pertaining to
its government and affairs" has also proved adequate. 29 Fourth, inclusion of a particular matter in the Constitution has been found to
preclude that subject from the exercise of home rule power. 30 Finally, an examination of the history of the treatment of the subject in
question under statutes at times has been dispositive of the issue. 3 1
In Houser, the court did not appear to apply any of these analytical
methods. In its formulation of the issue, the court did note that prior
to the 1970 Constitution all municipalities32 were endowed with
statutory demolition powers. The court, however, did not explain the
significance of this observation 3 3 nor did it examine the nature of the
demolition power to determine just what it includes.
The court's review of basic home rule principles was not unprecedented, but its failure to apply them to the facts was unique. By
replacing such analysis with mere general statements regarding the

28. See, e.g., Bruce v. Champaign, 24 I11.
App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1975) (power of
zoning); People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972) (power
to issue industrial development bonds); Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City of Joliet, 26 I11.
App.3d 27, 324 N.E.2d 453 (3d Dist. 1975) (power to control liquor sales).
29. Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 Ill.2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975) (extraterritorial zoning
power not a home rule power); Town of Godfrey v. City of Alton, 33 I11.
App.3d 978, 338
N.E.2d 890 (1975) (power to determine means of becoming a municipality is not free from
legislative controls); Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 I11.
App.3d 230,
309 N.E.2d 763 (1974) (power to litigate).
30. See, e.g., People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Il.2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100
(1977) (constitutional ban on branch banking prevents authorization of such banking from being
a home rule power); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 1ll.2d 256, 347
N.E.2d 716 (1976) (environmental protection is, in accordance with indications of intent of delegates to constitutional convention, primarily a state field of action); Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley,
61 Ill.2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975) (existence of unified statewide court systems created by the
constitution establishes that the administration of justice is a state concern, and the state's dominant concern precludes the power to act in this area from being a home rule power). See also
Minetz, Recent Illinois Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Authority of Home Rule Units
to Control Local Environmental Problems, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 306 (1977).
31. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 65 Ill.2d 1, 357
N.E.2d 433 (1976) (environmental protection act prevents local government units, even under
home rule status, from having standards more stringent than those imposed by the state); Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City of Joliet, 26 I11.
App.3d 27, 324 N.E.2d 453 (3d Dist.
1975) (history of dram shop acts indicates that a role for local governments was a consistent
feature).
32. "Municipalities," by definition, covers cities, villages and incorporated towns, whereas
the term "local government unit" also embraces such entities as school districts, park districts,
mosquito abatement districts, counties and townships. Only municipalities and counties can
ever be home rule units, so the absence of a term that covers both without including others
makes it necessary to fall back on the term "units of local government" when referring to
potential home rule units.
33. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
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breadth and scope of home rule powers, the court invites the conclusion that these powers are so encompassing that, of course, they include demolition powers. The fleeting reference to pre-1970 demolition powers suggests that the court may have regarded home rule
powers as embracing all functions performed by local government
units prior to the new Constitution. But because the court did not
articulate any conclusion as to whether demolition is a home rule
power, the meaning of these remarks and the court's purpose in
making them is a matter for speculation.
Statutory Construction in Houser
The court's treatment of the issue of statutory construction presented in Houser also is perfunctory. The language in question was
contained in an amendment to the demolition statute, enacted in
1971, 3 4 which stated that the amendatory act was inapplicable within
the jurisdiction of any home rule unit. The amendment had altered
the statute by extending its applicability to certain counties. Previously, it had been applicable only to municipalities. Urbana had taken
the position that a construction of an amendment which both extends
and restricts applicability of the statute was incongruous. The language in question, according to Urbana, could be given any of four
possible meanings. 35 However, the supreme court mentioned orly
one possible interpretation-that the amendatory act purported to
deprive home rule units of any power to maintain demolition actions.
The supreme court erroneously stated that this was the construction
36
given to the statutory language by the circuit court.

34. The amendment provided that a county board with a statutory health department may
demolish any dangerous and unsafe buildings within the territory of any city or village or incorporated town having less than 50,000 population. P.A. 77-1417, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.
35. Urbana's suggested possible constructions were: (1) that the restriction applied only to
the language added to the statute by the amendment; (2) that the language removed the former
statutory demolition power of home rule units, but leaves untouched their home rule based
power of demolition; (3) that no restriction at all was intended on home rule units; and (4) that
all powers of demolition of home rule units are thereby removed. The first of these possible
interpretations would seem to be by far the most congruent with the apparent intent of the
remainder of the amendatory act.
36. The circuit court had determined that the amendment removed the former statutory
demolition power of home rule units. In addition, it found that demolition is a home rule
power. Applying the rule stated in People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill.2d 347, 291
N.E.2d 807 (1972), the court upheld the statutory restriction, on the grounds that home rule
units were different from non-home rule units with respect to dependence on enabling legislation for demolition power, so that it was permissible to treat them differently.
One might wonder how the complaint against Houser was even filed if Urbana had no ordinance dealing with demolition actions. The complaint was filed pursuant to Urbana City Ordi-
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The supreme court professed doubt that such a construction could
be correct, and noted the incongruity that would result were the language in issue given such a construction, since a companion statute
dealing with injunctions to enforce building codes 3 7 contained no restrictive language. It further noted that the General Assembly had
employed a number of linguistic formulations to clarify the intended
effect of amendments to existing laws which might touch on home
rule powers. 38 Without explaining how this observation contributed
to an understanding of the language in question, the court concluded
that the legislature hardly could have intended that an amendatory
act which merely extended the power of demolition to certain counties would restrict demolition powers of home rule units within such
counties. Pairing this observation with the cited legislative formulae
39
would appear inapposite.
Thus, the court expressed dissatisfaction with one interpretation of
the statutory language, which it attributed to the circuit court, but
never indicated what it thought was the proper statutory construction. The court's misunderstanding of the actual construction of the
statute by the circuit court is so blatant as to raise doubts as to
whether the supreme court failed to understand the circuit court's
view of the status of demolition or deliberately chose to ignore the
possibility that such a power could derive from the constitutional
grant of home rule powers.

nance No. 7475-73, which set forth a minimum housing code, authorized building inspections
and citations, and authorized the inspector, if compliance was not forthcoming, to turn the
matter over to the city attorney.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (1975) authorizes the use of injunctions to secure
compliance with municipal building codes.
38. "The amendatory Acts... are not a limit upon any municipality which is a home rule
unit," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 8-4-3, 8-7-2 (1975) (issuance of refunding and general obligation bonds); "This amendatory Act does not apply to any (municipality) which is a home rule
unit," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-4-6.1 (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108

, § 22-306 (1975);

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§3-13-5, 3-13-6 (1975) (emergency appointment procedure for temporary mayor; pensions and medical benefits for police and firemen; payment limits for municipal officers); "This Act is not a limit upon any home rule unit," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85 § 1781
(1975) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11% § 705.02 (1975) (American Bicentennial Celebration Act, Regional Transportation Authority Act); "The provisions of this Section are not a limitation on the
powers of a home rule municipality," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-1-17 (1975) (power to receive
federal funds under Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973).
39. The examples cited by the court are all instances where the legislature has left the
powers of home rule units untouched, and has used clear language to express an intent to do so.
Accordingly, the examples would seem to support the view that the legislature is mindful of the
potential impact of amendments on home rule powers and tries to spell out their intended
effect. For the court to devote space to this list of examples (see note 38 supra) and then turn
its back on the problem of proper construction of the restrictive language in issue would seem
incongruous.
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This treatment of the issue of statutory construction in Houser
amounted to no analysis at all for it ignored well-established principles for resolving such issues. 40 The court's failure to consider possible alternative constructions of the statutory language in question
raises the suspicion that the court did not regard the issue of statutory construction as crucial to the outcome in Houser. On its face,
41
however, such a view would seem unsupportable.
Equal Protection Analysis
The court in Houser approached the issue of equal protection using
an interpretation of the demolition statute that it had criticized and
never adopted as its own. Under that interpretation, non-home rule
units but not their home rule counterparts would be able to maintain
demolition actions. From this perspective, a clear issue of equal protection was presented because the statute discriminated between two
classes of local government units solely on the basis of their status
with respect to home rule.
Only two prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions have dealt with
statutory discrimination on the basis of home rule status, and they
reached opposite results based on a delicate distinction. Accordingly,
the supreme court was faced with the question of which precedent to
apply. Rather than analyze these precedents, the court applied one
and completely ignored the other.

40. The principles of statutory construction in Illinois are extremely well-established. They
include the following:
(1) Statutes are to be construed in accordance with their apparent meaning and
the intent of the legislature. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 10 III.2d 489,
140 N.E.2d 687 (1957).
(2) The primary goal of construction is to affect the legislative intent. Hagen v.
Rock Island, 18 Ill.2d 174, 163 N.E.2d 495 (1960).
(3) Statutes themselves afford the best means of exposition and where the legislative intent can be determined from its provisions, that intent of a statute will prevail without resort to other means of construction. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill.2d 366,
357 N.E.2d 1180 (1976); Jones v. Pebler, 371 I11. 309, 20 N.E.2d 592 (1939).
(4) A construction leading to an absurd result should be avoided where two constructions are possible. People v. Hudson, 46 Ill.2d 177, 262 N.E.2d 473 (1970);
People v. Day, 321 I11.552, 152 N.E. 485 (1926).
(5) It will never be presumed that the legislature intended to pass an act in violation of the constitution and, if the purposes of an act can be carried out by another
construction, the unconstitutional construction will be avoided. Chicago v. Willett
Co., 406 I11.286, 94 N.E.2d 195 (1950).
41. Such a view would appear to run counter to the principles of statutory construction that
apply where an equal protection issue is involved, as discussed in note 36 supra. Moreover,
whether the statute was intended to deprive home rule units of all power or only statutory
power to act in matters of demolition may have been of crucial importance.
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The precedential cases are City of Carbondale v. Van Natta 42 and
People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin. 43 Van Natta concerned a
statute extending extraterritorial zoning powers to non-home rule
units but expressly excluding home rule units. McMackin dealt with a
statute enabling local government units to issue industrial development bonds which also expressly excluded home rule units. The statute in Van Natta was found to violate equal protection, but in
McMackin, the statute was upheld.
In Van Natta, the court noted that the power to zone extraterritorially could not be derived from the constitutional grant of home rule
power because, by virtue of its non-local nature, it did not pertain to
local government and affairs. 44 Accordingly, absent statutory authority, home rule units would be unable to engage in extraterritorial
zoning. A statute conferring extraterritorial zoning powers only upon
non-home rule units would therefore leave home rule units at a relative disadvantage. Such a result was found unconstitutional as a viola45
tion of equal protection.
In McMackin, the power to issue bonds to finance industrial development was found to inherently exist in home rule units by virtue
of their status under the constitution because that power did pertain
to local affairs. 46 Accordingly, home rule units possessed the power
to issue such bonds regardless of statutory authority. Under these
circumstances, a statute extending power to issue industrial development bonds only to non-home rule units would provide non-home
rule units with a power that home rule units already possessed. To
grant such power to home rule units by statute would be redundant.
McMackin presumed that language in the statute excluding home rule
units from the grant of authority was intended merely to deny them
statutory authority, and not to attempt to interfere with any constitutional powers of home rule units.
Thus, Van Natta and McMackin, read jointly, would seem to set
forth the proposition that the validity of a statute discriminating between home rule and non-home rule units in granting powers depends on whether the power in question is a home rule power. Van
Natta would require voiding the discriminatory provision if the power
is not a home rule power, while McMackin would call for upholding
it where the power is a home rule power.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

61
53
61
Id.
53

111.2d
483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975).
11.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972).
Ill.2d 483, 486, 338 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1975).
at 490, 338 N.E.2d at 23.
I1l.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d-807, 818 (1972).
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In Houser, the supreme court applied the rule in Van Natta and
voided the restrictive language in the demolition statute, but did not
even mention McMackin. The court borrowed language from Van
Natta, adopting the result that the exclusionary language should be
voided as a violation of equal protection while the remainder of the
demolition act remained valid. 4 7 However, the court studiously
avoided quoting language in Van Natta, referring to the fact that the
classification created by the statute was invalid only because home
rule and non-home rule units were equally dependent on legislative
authority to act in that field. Therefore both types of units are consid4
ered similarly situated with respect to the legislative purpose.
The significance of the court's failure to note this point is apparent
when one considers that this is the sole basis for distinguishing Van
49
Natta from McMackin, in which the opposite result was reached.
Moreover, this basis for distinguishing the two precedents is in effect
a restatement of the judicially formulated standard of equal protection
applied under both the federal and Illinois Constitutions: a law may
not discriminate between two classes if they are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law. 50 Under Van Natta and
McMackin, the concept of being similarly situated was interpreted as
being equally dependent upon legislative authority. This dependence
was found to turn upon the practical result of the statute's discriminatory language. Under both statutes legislative authority to act
was extended only to non-home rule units while home rule units
were unaffected.
In McMackin, however, the practical result of this discriminatory
treatment was found to be a situation of relative equality because an
inherent home rule power was substantially the equivalent of the
47. The court in Van Natta stated:
What remains of the statute after the excision of the offending classification is obviously independent and complete in itself. Too, it had been' enacted prior to the
objectionable additions of 1971, and obviously it cannot be said that the legislature
would not have passed the statute in the absence of the material which we delete.
61 Ill.2d 483, 491, 338 N.E.2d 19, 24 (1975).
48. In Houser the court quoted this portion of Van Natta:
We have seen that a municipality does not have extraterritorial zoning authority
under its home rule powers. Thus, if the legislative classification confining the
applicability of section 11-31-1 to non-home rule units were to be judged valid,
there would be the incongruous situation of non-home rule units being able to zone
extraterritorially, while home rule units could not.
Id. at 490, 338 N.E.2d at 23. However, the court omitted the next sentence: "We can see no
reasonable basis for differentiating between non-home rule so far as the power to zone extraterritorially is concerned." Id.
49. In the circuit court opinion this distinction was clearly drawn. See note 36 supra.
50. See note 16 supra.
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statutory power bestowed on non-home rule units. Thus, in McMackin the ultimate result of the discrimination was simply to bring
non-home rule units to parity with home rule units with respect to
the power in question.
In Van Natta, the practical result was substantial inequality because the statutory power in question was not equivalent of constitutional home rule. Thus discrimination as to extension of that statutory
power would deny home rule units a power granted to non-home rule
units. 51
Accordingly, both Van Natta and McMackin applied the constitutional standard of equal protection by first construing the challenged
statute, then determining whether the power in question was one
that home rule units did not already possess independently of legislative authority or whether the power was constitutionally granted.
In contrast, Houser skipped these steps for determining whether
home rule and non-home rule units were similarly situated with respect to the provisions of the demolition statute. In fact, it could not
have followed these steps under its equal protection analysis because
it had initially failed to determine whether demolition was a home
rule power and had not articulated any conclusion as to the correct
interpretation of the demolition statute's restrictive language.
A finding on the equal protection issue therefore represented a
failure to utilize the accepted standard for analyzing equal protection
issues. Moreover, it constituted a failure to adhere to other well-established principles of equal protection analysis which require that,
before a statute is voided as denying equal protection, an effort be
made to construe the statute in a constitutional form. 5 2
Thus, in Houser there was a finding as to equal protection, but no
analysis. The inadequacy of the court's treatment of the issue of equal
protection may make it difficult to believe that its equal protection

51. As the McMackin court reasoned, home rule units apparently still would be at a slight
disadvantage because they would have to enact an ordinance empowering themselves. The circuit court in Houser adopted this view stating: "[Van Natta] would not necessarily be authority

for the position that in every instance the qualifying language restriction would be inapplicable.
[McMackin] accepted the language..." See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
52. Moreover, in this context, the principles of equal protection and statutory construction
are interrelated, so that a construction that faces equal protection problems should be abandoned in favor of one posing no such difficulties. See note 40 supra. See also People ex rel. City
of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill.2d 347, 363, 291 N.E.2d 807, 819 (1972). Thus, the court's failure
to indulge in meaningful statutory analysis adds to the incongruity of its seizing upon Van Natta
without stating a reason for doing so. The 'court had multiple alternatives; at least four constructions were advanced by Urbana in its brief. In addition, the interpretation adopted by the
circuit court was different from the one adopted by the supreme court. However, the supreme
court made no effort to examine any of these constructions.
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finding was dispositive of the case. Although other grounds for
reaching the same outcome were available, 53 the court clearly indicated that its holding was based on equal protection.
THE FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF HOUSER

In assessing the precedential value of Houser it must be noted that
the decision contains no new principles for determining whether a
given power is a home rule power nor one for construing statutes. On
the contrary, it ignores settled rules of analysis for such issues and
even fails to articulate any conclusion as to these issues. It likewise
ignores well-established principles of construction of statutes under
equal protection challenge and fails to use the analytical approach to
equal protection of home rule units pioneered in two earlier decisions. And finally, without generating any analytical approach of its
own, it blindly applies the conclusion of one of these prior precedents
to the case at hand without even mentioning the alternative precedent.
It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that Houser represents no
more than a momentary lapse of judicial diligence, or more
euphemistically, that it is a decision whose applicability will be limited to the unique set of facts from which it arose. However, Houser
is a decision on state law issues made by the highest state court. Its
precedential potential will not remain untapped if any explanation of
its handling of the issues presented can be advanced. The very vagueness that makes Houser appear inscrutable leaves considerable
flexibility in constructing a rationale that would give it a fixed location
in the evolving constellation of home rule law. While little in Houser
will provide support for a given explanation, there is little to negate a
proposed explanation.
The central question which any such explanation must address is
why the rule of Van Natta rather than McMackin was applied. Each
of these precedents complied with established principles of equal pro53. One might argue, for example, that home rule units' powers were, at the time of their
establishment with the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, all powers possessed by local government units of like form under statutes then in effect. Language in Houser emphasizing that
municipalities enjoyed demolition powers before the Constitution went into effect could be
cited as support. See text accompanying note 33 supra. Thus, to take away home rule units'
statutory powers that existed in 1970 is to take away their constitutional home rule powers,
which can be done only in accordance with the limits of Sections 6(g) and (h) of the local
government article of the Constitution.
Alternatively, the case could have been resolved by interpreting the restrictive statutory
language as merely limiting the power of counties to engage in demolition within the jurisdiction of home rule units, and not as a limitation of home rule powers.
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tection, focusing on whether home rule and non-home rule units
were similarly situated. Why did the court adopt the conclusion of
one and not the other, and why did the court not expressly apply the
analytical scheme which distinguishes them from one another? And,
more generally, how could the court have chosen between them
without reaching clear conclusions as to the elements of this analytical
scheme in the case before it-statutory construction and determination of whether the power involved was a home rule power?
There are three logical approaches to explaining a choice between
two competing precedents: (1) Houser fell clearly within the scope of
applicability of Van Natta; (2) Houser was beyond the scope of either
precedent, so the court was free to extend either to cover this new
situation; or (3) Houser fell within the scope of McMackin, so that in
applying Van Natta's'contrary rule the court impliedly overruled
McMackin. Each of these approaches has the potential of supplying
the unarticulated bases of the result in Houser.
An argument under the first approach would readily explain application of Van Natta and partially explain the court's failure to mention
McMackin, for if the facts in Houser closely matched those in Van
Natta the court would be under no obligation to explain its nonapplication of a consistent, rival precedent. However, such an argument
would have to include contentions that the court had impliedly found
the statute and the power dealt with in Houser to be similar to those
in Van Natta, since the holding in Van Natta was carefully based on
these factors. Thus it would be necessary to argue that the court's
failure to articulate conclusions as to the proper construction of the
demolition statute and status of the demolition power did not mean
the court had failed to reach conclusions. The conclusions reached
were that the statute left home rule units without power to maintain
demolition actions.
In Van Natta, the statute was found merely to deny home rule
units statutory power to act in extraterritorial zoning, but because
there was no corresponding home rule power, the statute left home
rule units powerless in this area. To precisely parallel Van Natta, the
court in Houser would have had to find that the demolition statute
denied statutory power to home rule units and that there existed no
home rule power of demolition. However, it could also be argued
that the statute in Houser was viewed as denying all power, whether
statutorily or constitutionally derived, to home rule units in the area
of demolition, so that its effect would be to leave home rule units in
the same situation which constituted a denial of equal protection in
Van Natta.
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Arguing that Houser's findings paralleled those in Van Natta would
require overlooking that Houser applied its equal protection test to a
construction of the statute that left home rule units completely without power. However, the thrust of the discussion of home rule powers in Houser appeared to favor finding home rule powers
everywhere. In other words, the language of Houser tends to suggest
that the court favored findings contrary to those in Van Natta as to
both statutory construction and existence of a home rule power.
Arguing that the result of the statutes in both cases was the same
because the demolition statute as construed in Houser would have
denied all power to home rule units is more consistent with the language in Houser. However, such an argument would fail to explain
the court's settling on such an unconstitutional construction when it
was under a clear duty to impose a constitutional construction if possible. Likewise, such an argument could not explain the court's failure to refer to the requirements of Article VII, Section 6(g) and (h)
which state that statutes pre-empting the exercise of home rule powers meet exacting standards.
The second approach to explaining Houser, characterizing it as a
case of first impression, requires that Hauser be considered distinguishable from its two precedents. One distinction that could be
drawn would be that the demolition statute withdrew power whereas
the statutes in Van Natta and McMackin merely failed to extend
power. On its face, such a distinction appears spurious, but it may
gain some credibility when viewed in light of the fact that demolition
powers were enjoyed by all municipalities prior to adoption of the
1970 Illinois Constitution which created home rule powers. Various
arguments could be made that such pre-1970 powers are inviolate
because they are especially fundamental, and that the court was giving unclear voice to such a proposition in Houser.
Another way of distinguishing Houser would be to maintain that
the power of demolition is actually a composite, comprising distinct
subsidiary powers, some of which home rule units possess by virtue
of constitutionally derived home rule powers and some of which must
be based on a grant of legislative authority. 54 Under such a view the
54. This point requires some explanation. The term demolition power was used freely by
both the circuit court and the supreme court without any attempt to define or characterize it.
The problem is that a statutory power of demolition is defined in the demolition statute. This
power consists of the authority to file a complaint in the circuit court based on an inspection of
a building, to obtain an expedited hearing on that complaint and, if the complaint is upheld, to
demolish the building and thereafter obtain a lien against the property for the cost of the
demolition. On the other hand, if a constitutional home rule power existed, the question is
whether it necessarily is coextensive with the statutory power.
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demolition power would be a hybrid that could merit special treatment, but the distinction is probably too nice to deserve preservation
in practice. If a distinction between Houser and the prior precedents
were accepted, however, it would explain Houser's application of Van
Natta as an extension of the rule in that case. It would not, however,
explain why McMackin was not chosen.
While each of the explanations under these first two approaches has
some merit when applied to the choice of precedents none satisfactorily addresses the more general question of why Houser did not
articulate any resolution of the issues of statutory construction or
status of the demolition power. Because these subsidiary issues are
crucial to the choice between the two available precedents, failure to
explain the perfunctory treatment they received in Houser reflects on
the value of any argument which otherwise explains the choice of
precedents.
Under the third approach, which views Houser as impliedly overruling McMackin, it is possible to explain not only the choice of Van
Natta but also the court's lack of concern for these three issues. If
Houser is viewed as overruling McMackin, then obviously it constitutes a rejection of the equal protection rule in that case. That rule in
turn was based on a carefully drawn distinction -that there existed in
that case a home rule power upon which home rule units could rely
in the absence of statutory power to act and since the statute in question left that power intact, home rule units were not in the position of
helplessness as those in Van Natta were. To reject the rule of
McMackin is to reject that distinction, and to render unimportant the

Insofar as the statutory power of demolition overlaps with the home rule power (if any),
McMackin would seem applicable. Thus there was no violation of equal protection, and home
rule units would empower themselves by ordinance to exercise these subsidiary powers. However, Van Natta would appear applicable to the extent that statutory elements were absent from
the constitutional power. For example, the right to an expedited hearing would seem to be
within the state-dominated field of administration of justice. See the discussion of Ampersand,
Inc. v. Finley in note 30 supra.
Clearly, the result is that anything a non-home rule unit can do, a home rule unit can do. If
one finds that there is no home rule power of demolition at all, Van Natta applies and home
rule. units receive full statutory powers. If one finds that there is a constitutional home rule
power of demolition, upon which home rule units may rely and which is coextensive with the
statutory power conferred by their non-home rule counterparts, the result is the same.
Thus, any of the three possibilities-Van Natta, Mc!lackin, or both-will provide the same
practical result, except that under Van Natta, home rule units would not have to arm themselves with empowering ordinances. Obviously, unless some advantage can be supposed in requiring home rule units to go through this step, clarity and economy of effort militate in favor of
applying Van Natta to not only mixed power cases, but to all cases of discrimination in grants of
statutory power to non-home rule units.
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precise statutory meaning and existence or non-existence of a home
rule counterpart to the power in question.
A powerful argument can be made that the rule in McMackin was
of no value, however appealing may be its academic aspects. Although the distinction upon which it rested was sufficiently clear to
be applied, its practical meaning was simply that home rule units
could be discriminated against whenever the discrimination would be
ineffective. In other words, a statutory power can be denied to a
home rule power provided home rule units do not need it. Accordingly, overturning McMackin would restore realism to equal protection of home rule units, and prohibit harmless as well as harmful
discrimination in statutes dealing with powers of local government
units.
Under this view, Houser would extend Van Natta to cover not only
statutes discriminatorily extending power, but also those discriminatorily withdrawing power. Moreover, the cavalier treatment
given by Houser to the issues of statutory construction and status of
the power in question would support the contention that Houser establishes a per se rule of invalidity for statutes discriminating between
home rule and non-home rule units. In other words, regardless of the
meaning of the statute or the nature of the power it deals with, a
statute in any way discriminating between home rule and non-home
rule units will be unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.
Such a per se rule would be sound because home rule units need
equal statutory treatment, since they may enact ordinances which
supersede inconsistent applicable statutory provisions. 55 Thus, if a
statute limits powers of local government units, but does not contain
specific pre-emptive language, home rule units are free to ignore the
statute. The pre-emptive language, if added, would then make the
limitation uniform. Statutes extending powers to local governments
would automatically apply to home rule units, and any language purporting to deny such extending powers to home rule units would be
ineffective under Houser.
Accordingly, viewing Houser as adopting a per se rule of invalidity
of ordinances discriminating between home rule and non-home rule
units would explain both Houser's choice of Van Natta rather than
McMackin without detailed analysis and Houser's failure to resolve
the issues of statutory construction and status of the power of demolition. And such a view would be consistent with sound, realistic policy. However, there is one matter which such a view cannot explain:

55. See note 2 supra.
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why Houser did not expressly overrule the equal protection rule of
McMackin. Compared to the flaws of other possible explanations of
Houser, though, this is not serious and should not be a basis for
adopting the per se rule it embodies with its obvious policy advantages.
CONCLUSION

Urbana v. Houser comprises a holding but no rationale. Its bare
holding, that home rule units may avail themselves of the Illinois
demolition statute despite the restrictive language added to it by
amendment, is far less interesting or important than the rule that
may underlie it.
Houser's true significance, therefore, is not yet known. The rule its
holding represents will have to be articulated before its potential can
be assessed, and the greatest impact of that rule will be to set the
limits of constitutionality for future legislative attempts to discriminate against home rule units. Whether Houser closes the door to any
such future attempts or merely guarantees equal rights to home rule
units in matters relating to demolition remains to be seen. No decision since Houser provides a clue as to the view the supreme court
may adopt since none of them presented the kinds of issues involved
in Houser.56 Accordingly, Houser's statement that "it requires no
strong prisms to see the breadth and depth of home rule powers '' 5 7
stands in stark contrast to Houser's own impact on home rule law.
Until the rule stated in Houser is clarified, the law of equal protection of home rule units will be far out of focus.
Daniel H. Derby

56. Since Houser, only three Illinois Supreme Court decisions have touched upon home
rule. In Krughoff v. Naperville, 68 Ill.2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977), Naperville defended a
city ordinance requiring donations from developers for schools and parks as a condition for
approval of development plans on the basis that it was a valid exercise of the city's home rule
powers. The ordinance was upheld on the basis of the city's statutory authority. In Andress v.
Evanston, 68 Ill.2d 215, 369 N.E.2d 1258 (1977), the court held that the power of home rule
units to license real estate brokers had been successfully preempted by the Real Estate Brokers
and Salesmen License Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114 , § 124 (1975). The court ruled in ex rel.
Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill.2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100 (1977) that the constitutional ban on
branch banking prevents authorization of such banking from being a home rule power. Obviously, none of these cases produced' issues related to those raised in Houser, so none provide
any basis for determining the future significance of that case.
57. 67 Ill.2d at 273, 367 N.E.2d at 694.

